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In a conventional light water reactor loaded with a range of uranium and plutonium-based fuel mixtures,
the variation in antineutrino production over the cycle reflects both the initial core fissile inventory and its
evolution. Under the assumption of constant thermal power, we calculate the rate at which antineutrinos are
emitted from variously fueled cores, and the evolution of that rate as measured by a representative ton-scale
antineutrino detector. We find that antineutrino flux decreases with burnup for Low Enriched Uranium cores,
increases for full mixed-oxide (MOX) cores, and does not appreciably change for cores with a MOX fraction of
approximately 75%. Accounting for uncertainties in the fission yields, in the emitted antineutrino spectra, and
the detector response function, we show that the difference in core-wide MOX fractions at least as small as 8%
can be distinguished using a hypothesis test. The test compares the evolution of the antineutrino rate relative
to an initial value over part or all of the cycle. The use of relative rates reduces the sensitivity of the test to an
independent thermal power measurement, making the result more robust against possible countermeasures. This
rate-only approach also offers the potential advantage of reducing the cost and complexity of the antineutrino
detectors used to verify the diversion, compared to methods that depend on the use of the antineutrino spectrum.
A possible application is the verification of the disposition of surplus plutonium in nuclear reactors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nuclear reactors have been successfully used as a source of
electron antineutrinos in numerous antineutrino physics ex-
periments [1–4] and have been proposed for use in safeguards
applications [5–8]. Reactors have played central role in char-
acterizing antineutrino oscillations, due to their high inten-
sity and reasonably well predicted antineutrino emission spec-
trum. In these experiments, one or more detectors are installed
at fixed distances from a nuclear reactor core (or multiple reac-
tors) to measure the antineutrino rate and, in some cases, the
energy spectrum, through the inverse beta decay (IBD) pro-
cess. Antineutrino detectors have also been shown to be suc-
cessful in non-intrusive tracking of the relative reactor power
level [8] and burnup [5, 9].
In a typical light water reactor (LWR) on the order of 1027 an-
tineutrinos are emitted each day. A ton-scale detector placed
∼ 25 m from the reactor core can register as many as ∼ 5000
antineutrino events per day, providing information about the
instantaneous relative reactor power and the gradual change in
core-wide effective fuel burnup. The effective core-wide bur-
nup, combined with a reactor physics simulation using known
or declared operational parameters, can be used to deduce
other parameters of the reactor operation, such as the burnup
of individual fuel assemblies, or the operator-declared core
loading. These derived quantities may be of interest for ver-
ification and monitoring tasks that require tracking the mass
inventories of fissile materials at the assembly level.
Antineutrino-based reactor monitoring appears promising for
verification of in-core fuel isotopic composition and burnup
∗ bernstein3@llnl.gov
as well as reactor operating history. As discussed in Bernstein
et al. [6], key features of the methods include:
1. Non-intrusiveness: Antineutrino detectors are non-
intrusive because they operate well outside the core, un-
connected to any plant systems.
2. Robustness against tampering: This approach is resis-
tant to spoofing, tampering or masking due to the pen-
etrating power and great specificity of the antineutrino
signature.
3. Continuity of knowledge: Antineutrino detectors can
provide continuous knowledge of the reactor opera-
tional status and thermal power levels.
4. Maturity level: The method has been demonstrated
with detectors at a wide range of nuclear reactors.
The measured antineutrino rate and spectrum depend not only
on the reactor power level and initial fuel loading, but also on
the subsequent evolution of the reactor core as fuel is irradi-
ated during operation. Changes in fission fraction distribution
as fuel burnup progresses also change the distribution of beta-
decaying fission daughters. For this reason, antineutrino de-
tectors can be used to track not only the relative reactor power,
but also the core fissile composition.
One possible application of antineutrino monitoring is for
non-intrusive monitoring of fuel loading and evolution in civil
power reactors. In prior work, we and other authors have
examined sensitivity to the evolution of Low Enriched Ura-
nium (LEU) cores in Light Water Reactors (LWRs) [6, 10].
This represents the most typical configuration for civil power
reactors worldwide. In this paper, we examine the case of
LWRs fueled with a mixture of plutonium and uranium fuels,
referred to as mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel. A reactor operating
ar
X
iv
:1
61
2.
00
54
0v
2 
 [n
uc
l-e
x]
  5
 D
ec
 20
16
2with LEU fuel will exhibit a different antineutrino rate and
spectrum evolution in time compared to one loaded with MOX
fuel. If the reactor core composition is known, changes in an-
tineutrino flux can be used to determine operating power and
core-wide fissile inventory. Together with core simulations,
the spectral and rate information can also provide constraints
on burnup and fissile inventories in individual assemblies.
The separated plutonium used to produce MOX fuel is catego-
rized by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as
“direct-use” material, defined as “nuclear material that can be
used for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices with-
out transmutation or further enrichment” [11]. In this nomen-
clature, all other forms of nuclear material are referred to as
“indirect-use”. A careful study of the variation in measured
rates and spectra as a function of fuel loading is important
because of the heightened sensitivity surrounding safeguards
and monitoring of direct-use materials. For example, some
LWRs in Europe and Japan already use MOX fuel [12]. In ad-
dition, countries such as the US, Russia and the UK are con-
sidering the use of LWRs (as well as other reactor types) to ir-
radiate separated Weapons-Grade plutoniun (WGPu) [13, 14]
as a means of converting direct-use material into the indirect-
use form of irradiated spent fuel, from which the plutonium is
significantly more difficult to recover. The process of irradi-
ating WGPu in reactor cores, as a means of rendering it more
difficult to extract for weapons use, is often referred to as plu-
tonium disposition. Both current commercial MOX-loaded
cores, and any future plutonium disposition campaigns, may
be able to take advantage of antineutrino-based safeguards, ei-
ther to enhance existing safeguards protocols, or as part of a
future verification regime specifically geared towards WGPu
disposition.
In this paper, the antineutrino-based measurement approach is
applied to a high-fidelity study of reactor core composition as
a function of fuel burnup. In particular, we study the effects
of loading a Westinghouse-type nuclear reactor core with var-
ious admixtures of low-enriched uranium (LEU) and MOX
fuel in realistic conditions. Extensive benchmarks have been
performed for this reactor type to study the effects on reactor
performance of conversion to partial MOX fuel loading [15].
We performed full core simulations in order to account for
variations in individual assembly fuel composition and burnup
rates. The variation in neutron flux from assembly to assem-
bly is an important parameter that is not captured in simpler
one dimensional simulation approaches.
II. PREDICTION OF ANTINEUTRINO FLUX
Nuclear reactors are copious isotropic sources of antineutri-
nos, ν¯e, because of the abundant fission reactions occurring in
the core. A fission reaction is followed by production of two,
or more rarely three, fission products which preferentially β−
decay to achieve a stable neutron-proton ratio. On average,
fission products will undergo three β− decays to reach sta-
bility, each emitting an antineutrino. The number of electron
antineutrinos emitted varies with the number densities of the
fission daughters and with the energy of the neutron inducing
the fission reaction. Hence, the composition of the nuclear
core as well as the type of reactor play a role in the rate and
spectrum of emitted antineutrinos.
A commonly used mechanism for detection of ν¯e is the In-
verse Beta Decay (IBD) reaction, which requires the an-
tineutrinos to have a minimum energy of 1.804 MeV. This
threshold reduces the number of detectable antineutrinos to
∼ 1.5 − 2 per fission, depending on the isotope. IBD-based
detectors are typically based on proton-rich organic materi-
als and record the time and energy coincidence between the
products of IBD, a prompt β+ signal and neutron capture on
hydrogen or other capture agent, e.g. Gd or 6Li, which is de-
layed by 30-200 µs. The energy deposited by the prompt β+
is directly proportional to the antineutrino energy, permitting
a measurement of the antineutrino energy spectrum.
In a typical LWR, four main isotopes are responsible for over
99% of all fissions: 235U, 238U, 239Pu, and 241Pu. Extensive
efforts in the antineutrino physics community have used mea-
surements of the integral beta spectrum emitted by these iso-
topes to predict their antineutrino emissions. In the present
study, we use a parameterization of the antineutrino spec-
trum due to each fission isotope [16] to calculate the expected
changes in the summed antineutrino spectrum measured by
the detector as the fuel evolves.
III. COMPARISON OF LEU AND MOX FUEL
CHARACTERISTICS
To relate changes in antineutrino flux to initial core loading,
we examine the evolution of the fuel in the core. Both the
initial antineutrino rate and energy spectrum, and their sub-
sequent evolution during the reactor operating cycle will vary
depending on amount of MOX fuel that is loaded in the reactor
core. Plutonium is both bred and destroyed in a nuclear reac-
tor. Typical LWR reactors have plutonium conversion ratios
of 0.6-0.7 for LEU and MOX assemblies indicating that plu-
tonium production via a neutron capture on 238U in these re-
actors is insufficient to compensate for its destruction caused
by fission. Fission is the main consumption mechanism for
239Pu.
Table I compares typical LEU and MOX fuel characteristics.
The thermal fission cross section of 239Pu is higher than that
for 235U which results in an abrupt thermal flux gradient and
power peaking changes at the interface of LEU and MOX as-
semblies. The localized power peaking caused by this high
cross section imposes MOX fuel assembly design and location
constraints beyond those required for LEU fuel. In particular,
TABLE I. Comparison of LEU and MOX fuel.
UO2 (235U) MOX (239Pu)
Thermal fission σ (barn) 577 741
Delayed neutron fraction β 0.0065 0.0020
Number of ν¯e
per fission (Eν¯e > 1.806 MeV) 1.92±0.2 1.45±0.2
Energy released per fission (MeV) 201.7±0.6 210.0±0.9
3MOX fuel often features two or three zones of different plu-
tonium enrichment to smooth the thermal flux gradient within
the assembly as well as at the assembly interface. The delayed
neutron fraction, β, of 239Pu is much lower than for 235U and
as a result MOX fuel poses greater reactor control and safety
challenges. This effect is more pronounced for WGPu fuels
because of their higher fraction of 239Pu. Another important
distinction between LEU and MOX fuel in a thermal reac-
tor is the fission neutron spectrum. The harder neutron flux
characteristic of MOX fuel significantly reduces the utility of
chemical shims and control rods. The combination of lower
delayed neutron fraction and harder neutron spectrum in MOX
fuel makes it difficult to achieve a 100% loading in a typical
PWR core.
Averaged over energy, the number of antineutrinos released
per fission with energies above the inverse beta threshold is
∼ 25% lower for MOX fuels than for LEU. Thus, the ex-
pected antineutrino flux from a MOX-loaded core will be sig-
nificantly lower than that of an LEU core, at least in the be-
ginning of the cycle. In addition, MOX fuels generate more
heat per fission than LEU fuels. As a result, fewer fissions are
required to achieve the same core power, further reducing the
total number of antineutrinos emitted.
Operation of a full MOX core in a conventional LWR would
require an extensive evaluation, and may not be possible for
many reactors without significant modifications to reactor sys-
tems. However, various designs offering full-core MOX load-
ing do exist, for example the CE System-80 [17] and AP-
600/1000 reactor designs. The advantage of having a 100%
MOX loaded core is not only higher plutonium throughput,
but also an elimination of the severe flux gradients and power
peaking effects characteristic of partially-loaded cores.
IV. PREDICTION OF FISSION RATES USING MCNPX
An assembly-level analysis of LEU and MOX-loaded cores
was performed with MCNPX2.7 coupled with CINDER90.
MCNPX [18] calculates the steady state reaction rates, flux,
and normalization parameters, and CINDER90 provides time-
dependent isotope buildup and depletion. MCNPX is a gen-
eral purpose Monte Carlo code capable of modeling com-
plex geometries. It uses cross-section data evaluated from
ENDF/B-VII.
One eighth of the core was modeled because the symmetry
in core loading pattern allows for reflective boundary condi-
tions. 17 unique assemblies were defined in the model based
on isotopic composition. In this analysis, burnable absorbers
integrated into the fuel assemblies were modeled in full de-
tail. Control rods and chemical shim reactivity controls were
not included. CINDER90 uses a solver for independent con-
tributions to atom densities and is capable of tracking con-
centrations for 3456 isotopes (1325 fission products). Bur-
nup calculations were performed with MCNPX Tier 3 fission
product setting, which allows tracking of all available iso-
topes. The time-dependent fission rates output by the MC-
NPX/CINDER90 package, are convolved with parameterized
[16] antineutrino spectral densities (defined as the number of
antineutrinos per MeV and fission), to obtain the emitted flux
of antineutrinos as a function of energy and time.
V. STUDY OF WESTINGHOUSE-TYPE LWR CORE
A. Nominal Core Configuration
This study is based on a characteristic PWR core, one of the
most common reactor types in the US and worldwide. The
core geometry is modeled on that of a standard Westinghouse-
type reactor, with core height of 4 m and thermal power of
3200 MW. Because the physics of MOX assemblies is very
different from LEU assemblies, and because the interface be-
tween the two types of assemblies plays a significant role in
burnup accumulation and distribution, we modeled individual
assemblies rather than a homogenized core. The geometry and
composition parameters were adopted from an OECD Nuclear
Energy Agency Nuclear Science Committee benchmark [15].
The relative complexity of the fuel assembly arrangement dis-
cussed below is due to the non-trivial neutron physics that re-
sults from a partial MOX core.
MOX assemblies are designed to have geometric, power, and
neutronic compatibility with existing LEU assemblies in a
core. The initial simulated core geometry and isotopic com-
position correspond to a simplified single-batch (no once and
twice burned assemblies), single-enrichment core. The an-
tineutrino rate emitted by a core fully or partially loaded with
MOX fuel primarily depends on two factors: the fraction of
the core that is MOX and core-wide fuel burnup. To under-
stand the effect of both factors, the LWR core was loaded with
fresh LEU and weapons-grade MOX (WGMOX) assemblies,
and irradiated without assembly shuffling for three cycles, to
a burnup of about 60 MWd/kgHM. Plutonium is considered
weapon-grade when the ratio of 240Pu to 239Pu is less than
7%. Figure 1 depicts the MOX loading fractions in the core
that were considered in the analysis. Core reactivity in each
case was similar to the nominal 100% MOX case, in order to
avoid comparison of fundamentally different scenarios.
FIG. 1. Illustration of core layout for several MOX loading fractions.
4TABLE II. Fuel composition used in the analysis.
Uranium vector (wt%)
234U 235U 236U 238U
0.002 0.2 0.001 99.797
WG plutonium vector (wt%)
239Pu 240Pu 241Pu 242Pu
93.6 5.9 0.4 0.1
RG plutonium vector, 33 MWd/kgHM burnup (wt%)
239Pu 240Pu 241Pu 242Pu
56.0 24.1 12.8 5.4
B. Description of the LEU and MOX Assemblies Models
Fuel composition and geometric parameters of MOX and LEU
assemblies are provided in Table II. Note that LEU fuel as-
semblies have two enrichment values: 4.2% and 4.5% of
235U. About 1/3 of the fuel pins in an LEU assembly are In-
tegral Fuel Burnable Absorber (IFBA) pins, as shown in Fig-
ure 2. IFBA is a thin outer layer of ZrB2 on fuel pellets and
is consumed with irradiation. IFBA pins are heterogeneously
dispersed throughout the assembly to lower the reactivity of
fresh fuel and to flatten the peaking factors in the core.
FIG. 2. MCNP model of a UO2 assembly. Blue fuel pins corre-
spond to regular pins, and green/orange fuel pins contain IFBA. The
assembly also includes 25 guide tubes.
The loading pattern of MOX assemblies is heterogeneous and
includes three enrichment zones in each assembly. The en-
richment varies from 2.5% to 5.0% of 239Pu, with lower en-
richment near the edges of the assembly and higher enrich-
ments near the center. This configuration helps to reduce the
power peaking characteristic of LEU-MOX interface. The
matrix used in MOX fuel was depleted uranium with 0.2 wt%
of 235U. In MOX assemblies, the space normally occupied by
the control rod positions is reserved for 24 Wet Annular Burn-
able Absorber (WABA) pins. The three-zone enrichment and
WABA distribution is shown in Figure 3. WABA pins have a
complex annular structure illustrated in an insert of Figure 3.
The absorber used in WABA is Al2O3-B4C. Multiple WABA
FIG. 3. MCNP model of a MOX assembly. Shades of blue repre-
sent fuel pins with three plutonium enrichments. Insert image shows
details of WABA pins in the assembly. The central tube is an instru-
mentation tube.
pins are required in MOX assemblies because of their harder
neutron spectrum.
VI. RELATION BETWEEN MOX LOADING AND
ANTINEUTRINO RATE
To investigate the initial antineutrino emission rate as well as
its time-dependent evolution, the pure LEU core was com-
pared to a 100% MOX core and with fractional MOX cores,
loaded as illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 4 shows the evolu-
tion of the fission fractions for 235U, 239Pu, and 241Pu, as a
function of the core burnup and MOX loading. The contribu-
tion of 238U to the total fission rate is generally below 10%
and does not change considerably for any initial loading con-
sidered here. The fission fraction of 235U decreases linearly
with MOX loading and is also inversely proportional to bur-
nup. The fission rate of 241Pu is a good indicator of burnup
regardless of the core MOX fraction since the initial fraction
of 241Pu in the fuel is low for WGPu fuel. On the other hand,
the behavior of 239Pu is highly dependent on both the burnup
and the MOX fraction. As the MOX loading increases, the
fission rate of 239Pu increases nearly linearly for fuel of any
burnup.
The combined evolution of all fissionable isotopes is reflected
in the emitted antineutrino flux. The emitted flux is estimated
by multiplying the simulated fission rates for each isotope and
time step with the corresponding isotopic antineutrino spectral
density and summing over all isotopes. Figure 5 shows the
change in the emitted antineutrino flux above IBD threshold
as function of MOX loading in the core and fuel irradiation
time.
ntineutrino rate detected from a reactor core with a particular
initial fuel loading can be expressed as:
dNν¯e
dt
= γ (1 + n(t))Pth (1)
In this equation, dNν¯edt is the detected antineutrino count rate,
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FIG. 4. Change in fission fractions of 235U, 238U, 239Pu, and 241Pu
as a function of cycle time (core burnup) and initial MOX loading.
Loadings considered are (a) full LEU, (b) 25% MOX, (c) 50% MOX,
(d) 75% MOX, and (e) full MOX. Note relatively small effect of the
MOX fraction on fission rates of 238U and 241Pu isotopes.
γ is a constant that incorporates the effect of detector size,
position, and efficiency, n(t) is a time dependent sum over the
fission rates of each isotope, and Pth is the reactor core thermal
power. If the core power is known during the cycle, then fissile
content at each moment in the reactor core evolution can be
inferred.
The change in antineutrino rate relative to the beginning-of-
cycle rate is proportional to the amount of plutonium in the
core. Thus, the ratio of the instantaneous rate to the initial
rate throughout the cycle can indicate the MOX fraction in
the core as long as the power is fixed. On the other hand, if
the core MOX loading is known and constant throughout the
cycle, reactor power can be determined. This reflects a funda-
mental advantage of antineutrino monitors over conventional
power monitors, which can determine the total core power,
but are unable to quantify plutonium in the core. Note that
for an LEU core, antineutrino emission decreases with bur-
nup, while for a full MOX core, the antineutrino detection
rate increases with burnup. For cores with about 75% loading
of MOX, antineutrino emission does not change appreciably
with burnup. The absolute antineutrino rate depends on the
type of the fuel loaded in the core and conveys the informa-
tion about fuel burnup in a unique manner for any MOX frac-
tion. Figure 5 reflects the information carried by Eq. 1, with
(1+n(t)) describing the shape.
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FIG. 5. The total emitted antineutrino rate above the IBD threshold
as a function of burnup. Note that when the core contains 75% of
MOX, antineutrino emission does not change appreciably with bur-
nup. 0% MOX corresponds to a traditional LEU-type core.
VII. COMPARISON OF THE DETECTED SIGNAL FROM
WGMOX, RGMOX, AND LEU
In Section VI, we showed that the evolution of the emitted an-
tineutrino rate over a cycle is a function of the MOX loading
in the core. In this section, we elaborate on this basic result by
examining the detected rates with a realistic detector configu-
ration. We also compare the rate evolution for Reactor Grade
Plutonium (RGPu) to those for LEU and WGPu MOX load-
ings. The presence of RGPu in the core may be distinguished
6because the additional 241Pu has an emission spectrum that
differs from that of 239Pu, affecting the detected antineutrino
rate evolution.
A. Comparison of Detected Antineutrino Rates
In order to estimate detected antineutrino rates, we assume a
5 metric ton liquid scintillator detector, at 25 meter standoff
from the reactor core center. Backgrounds are taken to be
25% of the antineutrino rate averaged over all evolutions. This
background ratio is consistent with that achieved in a previous
reactor monitoring demonstration [7].
The highest-performing modern antineutrino detectors are
able to set a detection threshold at the inverse beta limit of
1.8 MeV for the antineutrino energy (e.g. [4]). In some de-
ployments, a higher threshold may be desirable in order to
suppress backgrounds. We varied the detector energy thresh-
old from 1.8 MeV to 3.3 MeV to determine the effect of this
parameter on sensitivity to changes in core loading. We as-
sume detection efficiencies of 40% (1.8 MeV threshold) or
30% (3.3 MeV threshold). The total rate of detected antineu-
trinos drops by a factor of about 1.5 as the threshold is in-
creased.
The estimated efficiency is based on reasonable extrapola-
tions from previous shallow-depth monitoring detector de-
signs [10]. In the detector, these thresholds would correspond
to energy depositions of ∼ 1 MeV and ∼ 2.5 MeV, where the
latter value is close to the highest energy naturally occurring
background gamma-ray.
In this section and the following, all plots show the results
assuming a 1.8 MeV threshold. As shown in Table IV, sec-
tion VIII, our principal results differ only modestly with the
higher detection threshold imposed.
Using the core powers and fuel loadings defined earlier, we
can estimate rates for each fuel loading and at each burnup
step in our MCNPX simulation.
To determine whether the fuel loading effects can be distin-
guished in realistic deployments, we must account for system-
atic and statistical uncertainties. Table III shows the assumed
sources of systematic error and their magnitudes, expressed as
a percentage of the detected rate. Systematic uncertainties on
the fission fractions of each isotope are taken from an analy-
sis of the Takahama benchmark [19]. At 11%, 241Pu has the
highest uncertainty in fission fraction, partially offset by its
relatively small contribution to the total fission rate. System-
atic uncertainties in the emitted antineutrino energy spectra
errors are taken from the Huber parametrization [16]. Cor-
related and uncorrelated spectral errors are treated separately
in the uncertainty analysis. For the correlated errors, a one
sigma (fully correlated) shift is made for all spectral bins for
each isotope. Uncorrelated errors are applied randomly bin
by bin, assuming Gaussian-distributed errors. The relatively
small systematic uncertainty on the total antineutrino output
from each isotope is estimated by comparing the estimated
output from the Huber [16] and Fallot [20] flux parametriza-
tions. Statistical errors are determined as the Gaussian error
on the daily number of counts at each burnup step, includ-
TABLE III. Summary of rate estimate systematic uncertainties
Source of Uncertainty Magnitude
Fission fraction ±2− 11%
uncorrelated spectral errors ±2− 7%
correlated spectral errors ±2− 7%
Total antineutrinos per fission for each isotope < 1%
Detector upper/lower energy threshold < 1%
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FIG. 6. The detected antineutrino rate evolution, for four reactor fuel
loadings. Systematic (hashed area) and statistical uncertainties are
given for 24 hour integration windows.
ing the statistical error associated with subtraction of the 25%
background acquired over a 30-day period.
Figure 6 shows the resulting detected antineutrino rates with
estimated systematic and statistical uncertainties for WGPu
and RGPu fuels, an LEU core and a partially loaded (1/3)
WGPu MOX core. As seen in the figure, the total detected
rate from any of MOX-loaded core is always less than that of
a full LEU core.
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FIG. 7. Detected antineutrino event rate for an antineutrino energy
threshold of 3.3 MeV, relative to the value at BOC with total uncer-
tainties.
7For either of the detector energy thresholds we have chosen,
we will show in the following section that the different fuel
loadings can be distinguished via a statistical test, in which
the measured rates are compared with a prediction based on
operator declarations. This is an important conclusion be-
cause a threshold-based background rejection strategy is sig-
nificantly easier to implement than other methods of back-
ground suppression, such as the addition of shielding. Such
an approach, involving measuring a raet above a well-defined
energy threshold, simplifies deployments for this kind of mon-
itoring task compared to a spectrum-based analysis, thereby
increasing the possible range of applicability of antineutrino-
based methods.
As explained above, only the combined effects of power and
burnup are constrained by the measured antineutrino rate evo-
lution. This leaves any rate-based method susceptible to
spoofing as long as the power is reported by the operator and
not measured. For example, the reported power could be fal-
sified over the entire cycle, in an attempt to mask the replace-
ment of one core type with another. However, as we show
here, a modest refinement of the present method can address
the simplest version of this spoofing strategy.
Figure 7 shows antineutrino signal rate evolution for WG-
MOX, RGMOX, LEU and 1/3 WGMOX + 2/3 LEU cases
normalized to the zero burnup value of the signal rate, for the
1.8 MeV threshold case. As we show in the following section,
the various fuel loadings can be distinguished via a statistical
test, even in the presence of a constant shift in the operator-
reported power. It is still possible for the operator to report
a varying power level in order to mask the effect of a change
in fuel type. However, this reported variation would itself be
suspicious in a monitoring context, and is thus not an effective
strategy.
A few important trends are apparent in Figure 7. As expected,
the LEU signal decreases significantly with burnup. This is
due to increased production of and reliance on 239Pu which
emits fewer antineutrinos per fission above the inverse-beta
detection threshold. On the other hand, the detected antineu-
trino rate is seen to decrease less rapidly, and then increase, as
the fraction of MOX fuel increases. This is due to higher fis-
sion fraction provided by 241Pu, whose specific antineutrino
emission rate is comparable to that of 235U. Finally, a 100%
reactor-grade MOX core is seen to have a slightly higher
absolute rate throughout the cycle compared with a 100%
weapons-grade MOX core, again due to the higher 241Pu frac-
tion in the reactor-grade core. As we show in the next section,
a hypothesis test can be used to take advantage of the observed
differences in antineutrino rate evolutions, in order to make in-
ferences about the fuel loading and fissile isotopic content of
the core.
VIII. HYPOTHESIS TEST FOR ANOMALOUS FUEL
LOADING
In this section we use a non-parametric hypothesis test, the
Wilcoxon Ranked Sign Test (RST) [21], to determine whether
different evolutions can be distinguished at a desired level of
confidence. The ranked sign test is used to accept or reject
the null hypothesis - in this case that the two distributions be-
ing compared are identical. The test compares a sequence of
predicted and measured data values and calculates a p-value
for the data ensemble. If, under repeated applications of the
test, the p-value is consistently below (above) a specific value
- here 0.05 - the null hypothesis is rejected (confirmed) with a
significance corresponding to the chosen value. Consistency
of the measured and predicted antineutrino rate evolutions via
the test can be used to infer that the fuel fissile isotopics and
the reactor operations were consistent with declarations made
by the party being monitored.
For the present test, we use the relative rates with errors as de-
scribed in the previous section, assuming the 1.8 MeV detec-
tion threshold for the antineutrino energy. We assumed a con-
stant, Gaussian distributed background equal to 25% of the
detected antineutrino rate averaged over all evolutions. The
treatment of errors for the measured data set (here simulated)
were summarized in the previous section. For the predicted
data set (also simulated) we use the mean spectral and fission
yield values as the most accurate estimate of these quantities.
The simulated measured and predicted data sets both account
for the random variations arising from counting statistics, in-
cluding the uncertainty introduced by the presence of back-
ground. Figure 8 shows an example evolution for a pair of
predicted and measured data sets, for the case of 0% MOX
(LEU) and 25% MOX cores.
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FIG. 8. A comparison of predicted and measured daily counts for a
full LEU core and a 25% MOX core.
The RST is efficient at identifying systematic shifts in one
population mean relative to another, even in the presence of
significant correlated or uncorrelated uncertainty. Table IV
shows the number of days of data acquisition required to reach
a p-value that is less than 0.05 for at least 90% of all trials. We
compare neighboring levels of MOX loading, as well as full
weapons-grade and reactor-grade MOX cores. As a check on
the method, we also examine the p-value for 100 trials com-
paring identical 100% WGPu MOX loadings. As expected the
average significance for identical evolutions is uniform on the
interval [0,1], with an average result of p ' 0.5. We take 0.05
to be the p-value threshold below which the null hypothesis
8is considered rejected, meaning the evolutions can be distin-
guished. By this standard, all adjacent MOX loadings can be
distinguished well before the end of a single 500-day cycle,
with the exception of 75% and 100% WGPU MOX core load-
ings. To fix the number of days required to achieve a given
level of rejection, we demanded that at least 90 of 100 ranked
sign test trials, each with measured and predicted data sets
randomly generated according to the underlying distributions,
gave a result of p < 0.05. Moreover, as seen in Table IV, a
change in detection threshold from 1.8 MeV to 3.3 MeV has
only a modest effect on the number of days required to acheive
the desired sensitivity.
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FIG. 9. A comparison of predicted and measured daily counts for a
75% and 100% MOX cores
A visual comparison of the predicted 75% and simulated mea-
sured 100% evolutions, including all uncertainties, is shown in
Figure 9. The 75% MOX evolution lies both above and below
the 100% evolution for different parts of the cycle. Because
the ranked sign test is most sensitive to shifts in one direction,
the test is poorly suited to this particular case. Importantly, the
results show that weapon-grade and reactor-grade MOX cores
can be distinguished with high confidence within a single cy-
cle. This discrimination capability is particularly important
for plutonium disposition campaigns, for which the monitor-
ing party has a strong interest in confirming that weapons-
grade fissile materials are being dispositioned.
IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Antineutrino detectors offer an important capability that may
be useful for a range of modern safeguards and reactor mon-
itoring applications. These detectors provide continuous
knowledge about reactor operations. If core power and/or
initial fuel loading are known, rate-based antineutrino detec-
tors have a capability of deducing other operating parameters,
in particular checking whether operator-declared core load-
ing matches that of the actual operating core. The technology
is well-established by multiple fundamental science and safe-
guards demonstrations. Because the detector can be located
well outside the reactor core and requires to connection to
TABLE IV. The approximate minimum number of days required to
ensure an average p-value less than 0.05 for 90 of 100 trials. Except
for the comparison of predicted 75% and measured 100% evolutions,
all other evolutions are capable of being distinguished within a single
500 day evolution.
Predicted MOX
fraction
Measured
MOX fraction
Minimum days re-
quired to achieve
p-value < 0.05 for
90% of RST trials, for
the indicated detection
threshold
1.8 MeV 3.3 MeV
0% 25% 80 80
25% 33% 150 165
33% 50% 195 195
50% 75% 54 60
100% WG 100% RG 300 315
plant systems, the installation is non-intrusive to reactor op-
erations.
Using assembly level simulations, we have shown that an-
tineutrino flux decreases with burnup (or equivalently, cycle
day at full power) for LEU cores, increases for most MOX
fuel loadings, but does not appreciably change for cores with
MOX fraction of about 75%. We also demonstrated that a hy-
pothesis test that evaluates antineutrino rate information only
can be used to distinguish a range of MOX loadings within a
single cycle, including between WGPu and RGPu cores. For
nonproliferation applications such as plutonium disposition,
rate-based detectors offer important advantages in terms of
simplicity of construction and operation, which likely facil-
itates their adoption in monitoring regimes.
This assembly-level core simulation has more detail than is
found in point-like core simulations. Still more insight can be
gained by simulating a more realistic mix of assemblies with
various enrichment and burnup values in a single evolution.
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